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Abstract
RFID tags are held to become ubiquitous in logistics in the near fu-
ture, and item-level tagging will pave the way for Ubiquitous Computing,
for example in application fields like smart homes. Our paper addresses
the value and the production cost of information that can be gathered
by observing these tags over time and different locations. We argue that
RFID technology will induce a thriving market for such information, re-
sulting in easy data access for analysts to infer business intelligence and
individual profiles of unusually high detail.
Understanding these information markets is important for many rea-
sons: They represent new business opportunities, and market players need
to be aware of their roles in these markets. Policy makers need to con-
firm that the market structure will not negatively affect overall welfare.
Finally, though we are not addressing the complex issue of privacy, we
are convinced that market forces will have a significant impact on the
effectiveness of deployed security enhancements to RFID technology.
In this paper we take a few first steps into a relatively new field of eco-
nomic research and conclude with a list of research problems that promise
deeper insights into the matter.
1 Introduction
RFID tags are widely held to become ubiquitous in our future. They are already
essential in logistics [11], and item-level tagging will pave the way for Ubiquitous
Computing applications such as so-called smart homes [12]. Our paper is based
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on a still hypothetical (but widely accepted) Ubiquitous Computing scenario
where goods are tagged on a common basis, and aims to demonstrate that the
incentives in this scenario will induce thriving markets for information of the
form “serial number i was at location l at time t”. These markets will not only
mediate between the tag wearing individuals and tag reader operators, but also,
and more importantly, among reader operators, data mining service providers,
profile dealers and data customers after the information has been harvested.
The main and currently most influential industry standards for tags, readers and
number schemes are set by the industry consortium EPCglobal. Conforming
EPC tags transmit an Electronic Product Code (EPC), a data structure that
has a globally unique value on each tag (see Appendix B). Where applicable,
we use the terminology established by EPCglobal, our arguments, however, do
not depend in general on any details in the standards. The central assumptions
we use are made explicit in the following.
EPC tags for the mass market are small, short-ranged, and extremely cheap
RFID devices.1 In particular, a tag cannot keep track of who is reading it and
when it is read, or selectively deny reading. Standards for more capable tags
have been proposed that can selectively block read-outs or even communicate
with trusted readers only over encrypted radio links.
Though the EPC Class 1 chip specification includes a kill password to deacti-
vate a tag permanently, this would prevent any after sale application, and the
usability of these or comparable features is still unclear (see Section 4.3.1). We
claim that collection and pervasive distribution of tag data is essential to the
usefulness of RFID technology. Thus our arguments about the emergence of
trace markets would still remain basically valid even in the presence of powerful
and usable security enhancements.
The envisioned ubiquity of tags, together with corresponding new (as well as
existing) databases and sophisticated data mining techniques, promises an enor-
mous amount of information on the movements of goods and individuals, and
on correlations between entities and objects.
However, very little work has been done on getting accurate or even plausible
estimates on the value of this information, the cost of harvesting it, or on finding
a model that describes what will happen if this scenario becomes reality. To
confuse the situation further, there are statements from industry leaders to the
effect that interest in this information is negligible,2 despite efforts to create
test beds that facilitate access to it.3
On the other hand, understanding the economics of EPC traces is crucial for
1Reading ranges depend on frequency, antenna, surroundings and energy. Vendors are
aiming at costs of less than 0.05$ per tag for the mass market.
2See the statement of the METRO Group during the consulta-
tion process by the EU Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/consultations/rfid_en.htm
3METRO Future Store, http://www.future-store.org/
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Figure 1: Players in EPC Trace Markets.
many reasons. Policy-makers need to address the question whether there is need
for regulation. Market players want to know the ground on which they compete.
Finally, in order to estimate the impact of Ubiquitous Computing technology
on the privacy of individuals, it is necessary to understand the motivations and
incentives of the parties that operate it.
The goal of our paper is to give a first description of EPC trace markets, iden-
tify some of their most obvious characteristics, and lay the ground for future
research.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we give a brief overview of our
terminology, the market players, and the structure of goods. In Sections 3 and
4 we informally assess the demand and the supply side, respectively. In Section
5 we compare the emerging EPC trace markets to the markets for online traces
that exist today, drawing some conclusions on differences in interpreting infor-
mation and on market risk. In Section 6, we present further economic research
topics that need to be addressed in order to develop a deeper understanding of
EPC trace markets.
2 Trace Markets
The raw product of EPC trace markets is a database of entries of the form
(i, l, t): i is an identifier (in our case: an EPC); t is a time value (relative
or absolute); and l is a location identifier (a GPS coordinate tuple, site of
the supermarket, a reader number, IP address, or any useful and consistent
description of the reader’s context). The original source of traces is the direct
tag-to-reader interaction, where a reader supplies power to all tags in range and
collects their EPCs. A reader could be a fixed installation, a hand-held device,
or it could be integrated into a mobile phone or PDA.
We distinguish three main categories of market players (see Figure 1):
• The Individuals (Data Subjects). Entities that possess tags and generate
traces. This category includes private citizens and employees of compa-
nies.
• The Data Consumers . The end users of trace data who require market
profiles or information on individuals for various reasons. (See Section 3.)
• The Data Suppliers . Suppliers of trace data may be collectors who operate
tag readers and feed databases, or aggregators who provide services by
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trading, pooling, and data mining such databases. (See Section 4.)
The relationships and interactions between these categories are complex for
various reasons.
Individuals and Data Suppliers. Information in this relationship can be
collected legally or illegally. There are economic models in which individuals
face a trade-off, providing personal information (disutility) in exchange for cus-
tomized goods and services (utility). Calibrating the involved utility functions
is an ambitious goal.
Data Consumers and Individuals. Being better informed about the mar-
ket, the data consumers are able to offer better products and services for the
individuals. The information available from trace databases can greatly facili-
tate price discrimination. The reliability of data and the appropriate degree of
price discrimination based on this is to be studied.
Data Suppliers and Data Consumers. The players in this relationship
no longer consider the EPC traces to be personal information. They rather
regard them as tradeable information goods that can be sold to data consumers,
who may then use the data to improve their own competitiveness in another,
independent market.
The authors of [3][22][1] address the first two relationships. In this paper we
focus on the relationship between data suppliers and data consumers, whose
interests disregard those of individuals.
3 The Demand Side
There are indications that RFID traces in general and EPC traces in particular
will prove to be instrumental to many parties. For example, a collection of
possible uses is offered in an IBM patent application from as early as 2001 [13]
(pointed out later by [2]):
In another embodiment, instead of determining the exact identity
of the person, some characteristics such as demographic (e.g., age,
race, sex, etc.) may be determined based on certain predetermined
statistical information. For example, if items that are carried on the
person are highly expensive name brands, e.g., Rolex watch, then the
person may be classified in the upper-middle class income bracket.
In another example, if the items that are carried on the person are
”female” items typically associated with women, e.g., a purse, scarf,
panty hose, then the gender can be determined as female. [...] (p. 2)
When a person enters a retail store, a shopping mall, an airport,
a train station, a train, or any location where a person can roam, a
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RFID-Tag scanner located therein scans all identifiable RFID-Tags
carried on the person [...] (p. 3)
This patent application gives anecdotal evidence that some experts did foresee
the potential usefulness of gathering quality information through RFID traces.4
In this section we try to give a more detailed view on the motivations of po-
tential trace consumers. We consider companies, governments, individuals, and
research organizations.
3.1 Companies
There are many reasons for the private sector to develop a substantial demand
for traces. Even companies that gather their own supply of traces will have
reason to buy from or pool with other companies for data completion, integration
and refreshment.
Personalization. There are empirically verified economic benefits for com-
panies to personalize their goods or services [20]. This has influenced industry
best-practices [19]. Especially personalization and recommendation systems will
be highly pertinent to in-shop or home RFID applications (B2C) and will also
increase demand for trace data in E-Commerce. Some benefits of personaliza-
tion are (cf. [21]) the ability to turn casual browsers into buyers, the potential
of cross-sells by recommending matching items to something already owned or
selected by the customer, increased customer loyalty and better customer rela-
tionship management.
Personalized insurances5 will stimulate a huge demand for traces by insurance
companies to study a person’s whereabouts, movements and consumption habits
[4]. Traces will also enhance the effectiveness of credit scoring enormously by
providing detailed insights into the subjects’ possessions and income. An indi-
cator is today’s market for corresponding information (see Appendix A).
Price Discrimination and Direct Marketing. Price discrimination has
been identified as an important driver for privacy erosion on the Internet [18].
To maximize profit a customer should ideally pay the maximum amount that
is acceptable to her. In order to charge different customers different prices
for the same services or goods, data is needed to estimate their willingness to
pay. Data generated through personalization of shopping sites, click tracing and
other measures used on the Internet are conducive to such analysis [5].
Traces will be a new source of relevant information that also pertain to the physi-
cal world, answering interesting product-related and customer-related questions:
Which products are likely to be bought together? What EPCs do people carry
who do (do not) enter my store or buy my products? How do customers move in
4Interestingly, IBM has also entered the market for RFID privacy solutions later [16].
5An example today is “Pay as you drive“: http://www-1.ibm.com/services/ondemand/norwichunion.html
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my store (all day)? What are the characteristics of my customers? What do they
already own? What are their budgets? How do customers and non-customers
differ? Which additional products should I offer to a customer?
If each customer in a shopping mall is recognized by the IT infrastructure as a
walking list of the items she bought (nearly equivalent to a fully personalized
customer), she is a much more convenient target for product placement and
direct marketing strategies.
Industrial Espionage. Players in many industries will be tempted, if not
actively interested, in the possibility of inspecting a competitor’s supply chain
or simply lists of items or persons that enter their buildings. Also, less aggressive
business intelligence can make use of EPC traces as well: “Which competitors
have made deals with which of my prospects? What kind of deals are these?”
Traces can make this information more accessible than it is today.
Intensified Competition for Information. In a competitive environment
where each individual player can decide to increase her data pool in order to
increase her advantage over other players, an arms race in business intelligence
can emerge. The following game can be used to model this effect. Let the infor-
mation held by company i in the current round be Ii, let c, v be monotonously
increasing functions describing the cost and value of that information, respec-
tively, and let the utility Ui of company i be
6
Ui =
v(Ii)
avgj 6=iv(Ij)
− c(Ii).
Then, if company i increases its information in the next round to I∗i = Ii + δi,
company j is worse off unless it increases I∗j = Ij + δj such that
U∗j =
v(I∗j )
avgk 6=jv(I
∗
k )
− c(I∗j ) ≥ Uj .
This holds assuming that all other players do not change their information levels.
However, as now both companies i and j have increased theirs, all other players
have even greater pressure to do so as well in the next round.
3.2 Governments
For government agencies it will often be more convenient to accumulate raw or
personalized traces from private companies, rather than to invest into additional
reader infrastructures that cover sufficient area for permanent surveillance.
Today, in the US, government agencies often buy personal data from profile
brokers like ChoicePoint.7 We expect this trend to extend to the EPC traces at
6A more accurate utility function can no doubt be developed. But as long as Ui increases
with Ii and decreases with Ij , j 6= i, our argument holds.
7References gathered by EPIC at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/
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least until enough public readers are installed (e.g. for ticketing, traffic moni-
toring, billing and building security). We list some of the potential utilities of
EPC traces for governments below.
Customs and Tax Collection. Ownership of goods, their transfer and move-
ment patterns are very interesting to custom services that could now track
imported and exported goods. Likewise, tax collection for luxury items will
be made easier by tracking items and their owners. Simply the threat of this
possibility might reduce delicts and misdemeanor.
Law Enforcement. The police will have a high interest in traces, as they
will prove extraordinarily useful in forensics. They could be used to address
questions like ”Where have these particular boots been sighted within the last
month?”. Monitoring and remote surveillance of criminals or suspects will be
made much easier. Further, ideas like supporting civil disaster recovery plans
through new technologies, e.g. in case of epidemics, may become possible once
trace databases have become sufficiently large and accurate.
Intelligence Agencies. Even if they already have access to equivalent infor-
mation that traces could deliver, traces could be used as confirming evidence
to reduce uncertainties. Live traces could support other forms of surveillance,
social (e.g. terrorist) networks could be analyzed more easily. Nevertheless, the
challenge of false positives and false negatives will have to be tackled even more
seriously with the increase of EPC traces.
3.3 Individuals
Individuals will also be interested in using trace databases. This might be to
quench natural human curiosity, or for more sinister activities like blackmailing
or spying on neighbors, relatives or co-workers. On the other hand, applications
for child care as well as care for elderly persons make use of Ubiquitous Com-
puting data, and are appreciated by their users for improving their quality of
life considerably.
3.4 Researchers
Finally we foresee a substantial demand in raw data to support scientific re-
search. Examples include economics (e.g. improving research on trade), research
in epidemics, migration and mobility research, and social sciences in general.
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4 The Supply Side
The structure of the supply side of a market decides to what extent anybody
will engage in production. In order to understand this, we look at the reader
locations where data is physically harvested, and the globally connected IT
infrastructure where it is exchanged and processed. Then, we assess potential
obstacles that may perturb the trace supplier’s job, namely technical and legal
countermeasures.
4.1 Local EPC Traces
In Ubiquitous Computing environments like smart buildings RFID will be a fun-
damental technology to discriminate contexts. Applications like smart fridges,
laundry machines and home medical advisors could use RFID and the EPC Net-
work to provide inhabitants with new services. Extensive reader infrastructures
will be installed for these or other primary purposes and may be used officially
and with implicit consent for trace harvesting. For example, these technologies
can be employed inside a shop at the cashiers, scanning and tracking the shop’s
EPCs (and those that the customers brought with them).
For service providers there lies plenty of opportunity for the secondary use of
these collected traces, which will often be already associated with an individual
(like in the case of smart homes) or easily linkable (in the case of shop cus-
tomers). As the market for traces develops, the reader operation is likely to
be outsourced to specialized service providers. These will serve a greater set
of customers in multiple settings and have access to larger volumes of data. If
their contracts permit them to do so, these specialized service providers can also
sell this data to formerly uninvolved third parties.
There also could be rogue readers operating despite the dissent of the inhabitants
of their environments. Mobile or fixed installations can be used to scan strategic
areas within cities or buildings to gather traces without consent or notice. More
secretively, there is the possibility to place passive sniffers8 near official reading
infrastructures to capture RFID communications and collect transmitted EPCs.
Finally, creative marketing projects might come up with gadgets like a portable
music player that traces tags around its owner, producing more or less a com-
plete profile of her and even of persons she knows. These mobile trace databases
could be uploaded to the vendor and traded for music or other services with
insignificant unit production cost. Such business models could be designed in
the spirit of customer loyalty programs.
8RFIDdump Project: http://rfiddump.org/
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4.2 Harvesting EPC Network Logs
The EPCglobal network is designed to form a global information retrieval net-
work for objects carrying tags with EPCs. It follows the data-on-network
paradigm, i.e., information about objects is not stored in the corresponding tags.
Instead, these tags only contain primary keys for data look-up from distributed
databases on the Internet, so called EPC Information Services (EPCIS). The
main function of the EPC Network is data exchange, first within supply chains,
then most probably as a backbone to an Internet of Things and to Ubiquitous
Computing environments.
The EPC Network (like every solution for EPC Information retrieval via the
Internet) will constitute an excellent trace trading system and, possibly even to
a larger extent than local RFID interaction, a global trace-collection mechanism.
Every EPCIS can itself be a trace collection point, simply by log file analysis.
Instead of the physical location an EPCIS collects the source IP of the query,
and probably further identifiers and authentication tokens from the information
protocol layer. Third parties cannot sniff this trace-containing traffic if it is
encrypted.
But the look-up service Object Naming Service (ONS) is a weak spot in the
proposed design [8]. ONS uses the structure of an EPC, which is transformed
into a domain name, for query delegation and in functionality is akin to the
Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS). Every ONS server in the resolution
chain is a potential trace collection point.9 ONS is a clear text protocol and is
about to inherit all the well-known security weaknesses of DNS. In the worst (or
best, respectively) case, every IP node in the ONS resolution chain, every router
or network analysis device in the path will be able to collect partial traces.
We anticipate that EPC information exchange over the Internet, and especially
the EPC Network, will make traces even more widely available, in addition to
those generated by local and direct skimming via RFID readers. Collection and
data aggregation systems like intrusion detection systems that are in place today
could be modified to harvest EPC trace data from the Internet. Combining these
into large, global aggregation services that exist for, for example, distributed
intrusion detection10 today, or including them in search engines like Google or
RFID-pendants of services like Where’s George11 might let lookups for specific
EPC clusters succeed with high probability.
9The ONS specification as of today does not use the serial number for delegation, but
leaves it as option for the future. In its current form, identifying and tracing rare item classes
or clusters of items will be possible.
10DShield: http://www.dshield.org
11http://www.wheresgeorge.com/
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4.3 Restricting Supply
In the following sections, we look at the strategies for restricting the unwanted
use of EPC traces and study their possible repercussions for the trace trade
markets.
4.3.1 RFID Protection: Restricting the Information Flow
If tags are ubiquitous, a lot of privacy issues arise [2][10][23]. Several security
enhancements to control the flow of information have been proposed to maintain
a certain level of privacy for individuals [10][15].12
In order to estimate the density of traces available for harvesting and trading,
one needs to understand these security enhancements. In this section, we give
a very brief overview of some existing data protection methods and identify
problems that may negatively affect their efficiency in practice.
Tag readers are publicly available and will become cheap. Hence, anyone will
be able to read all the tags located within a few meters distance and with
minimal effort maintain traces of the area around her readers. Consequently,
not only could operators of legitimate readers re-use the data for trading, but
there could be reader operators that collect traces solely for the trace markets.
Various enhancements to block or control read-outs have been proposed in order
to confine the set of readers to those deemed legitimate by the individual wearing
the tags. Although promising, these solutions face a number of obstacles.
Selective Deactivation or Blocking. This approach is inconvenient and
(without strong authentication) highly problematic. If a chip needs to be dis-
abled every time a hostile reader might be nearby, and re-activated every time a
friendly reader is expected to read it, things will frequently go wrong. The user
will forget to disable tags, or hostile readers will be installed close to friendly
readers, and the user will have to choose between not profiting from the tag
infrastructure and being exposed to a hostile read-out.
Symmetric Cryptography. Authenticating readers (possibly also the tags)
and communicating over an encrypted channel can make blocking out untrusted
readers both more convenient and more reliable. Symmetric cryptography can
be used for both authenticity and encryption.
Since the storage capacities of a tag are extremely limited, only a small number
of symmetric keys can be stored on a tag. All readers potentially communicating
with a tag need to possess one of the keys stored on the tag. This establishes
trust clusters among large numbers of readers and huge numbers of tags. Each
message can only be shown to originate from a certain cluster, not from a certain
12A dedicated Web site for RFID security and privacy research is maintained by G. Avoine:
http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/~gavoine/rfid/
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device. Consequently, any adversarial trace collector with physical access to any
tag or reader from a given trust cluster can retrieve the symmetric key for that
cluster, pretend to be a trusted reader, and harvest the protected tags.
Asymmetric Cryptography. Whereas symmetric authentication and encryp-
tion in applications with many communication partners quickly exhaust the key
management capabilities of the parties involved, asymmetric cryptography ex-
ceeds the computing resources of most RFID tags. Especially tags that have
no batteries and need to be small and cheap enough to tag small and cheap
goods are not suitable for the implementation of such mechanisms. Asymmetric
cryptography is at best considered an option for tags with higher capacity used
in production and logistics.
Trust. A more exotic option is to broadcast privacy policies from a PDA [9].
This PDA would ask all readers in scanning distance to ignore all sensitive
EPCs, and law enforcement will provide the incentives for reader operators to
obey the policies that are expressed. This approach is likely to fail in the trace
application scenario for at least two reasons: First, economic incentives to get to
the data are strong, as this paper demonstrates; second, with P3P, an existing
system based on this idea has proven too inconvenient for the user to be widely
deployed [14]. So in practice, neither opt-in nor opt-out are easy options.
Writing privacy policies is complex and cumbersome. More importantly though,
content providers on the Web have the power to make it inconvenient for users
to choose a restrictive privacy policy. Usually they can do this by configuring
unnegotiable policies, leaving it to the user to either defer the use of a site, or
to relax her own preferences. In the RFID future we envision, those players
planning EPC-based services will be able to reiterate this practice, but then not
only Web browsing behavior, but rather the activities of the user in the physical
world will be affected.
Link between Company and EPC Network. The security of current EPC
Network and ONS drafts is, to say the least, controversial (see Section 4.2
above). So even if the link between tag and reader would be perfectly secure,
the information flowing through the global EPC infrastructure (of which readers
are only the leaves) provides a potentially even richer field for trace collectors
and brings new challenges to IT security.
4.3.2 Privacy Laws and EPC Traces
In some countries there are laws that restrict the ways in which governments,
corporations, and citizens are allowed to collect, store, distribute and make use
of personal information. However, the raw traces under scrutiny here are not
personalized per se. They can only provide privacy-relevant information by use
of data mining techniques and the consultation of further data sources (such as
a data warehouse that may contain a mapping from EPCs to customer IDs).
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Each single act of trace harvesting that is noticed and brought before a court
will likely not have caused any damage on its own, as the data is only valuable
in large amounts. Therefore, it is unclear whether trace collection is covered by
privacy laws at all.
The Question of Enforceability. Suppose the problem becomes apparent
to the public and to policy makers in the future and a law prohibiting trace
harvesting and trading is passed (despite the economic advantages of collecting
such information). If the incentive structure is in favor of trace trade, an illegal
market will emerge in substitution of the legal markets of traces, just like the
markets for illegal drugs, botnets, or credit card numbers are perfectly healthy
and operational despite the laws against them. Laws can affect the cost of
supply (i.e., the price of the trace harvesting and trading infrastructure) and
the product quality (i.e., the trace density), but whether the impact on trace
markets in particular will be high enough to stop trade is uncertain.
De-Anonymization. Privacy laws usually introduce some notion of how per-
sonalized information is. For example, customer profiles that are aggregated to
one tuple for every five households may be considered anonymized, or a certain
volume of trace information may be considered harmless. However, in practice
even a single aggregated data source often contains enough information for a
good data analyst to de-anonymize it to a large extent.13 A data pool of traces
and other corpora that is too enriched to be legally owned by one company can
simply be split up between networks of companies, and the knowledge can be
combined in a way that is certain to go unnoticed until aggregate data emerges
in a completely different context.
From Personal Data to Intellectual Property. There may even be laws
such as intellectual property rights antagonizing privacy regulations. Once a
market research agency has aggregated the collected trace data and thereby
turned it into intellectual property, it is not only accessible to paying third
parties, but also harder to obtain by the affected individuals.
Explicit Consent where there is no Contract? Explicit consent to collec-
tion of personal data can of course not be given if there is not even a contractual
relation between the profiled individual and an independent trace collector op-
erating in public spaces, or in private spaces not owned by him. On the other
hand, users have to accept the terms imposed by the owner of a space they
enter, for example video surveillance in shopping malls. By analogy, it seems
likely that the owner of a shopping mall may legally decree that all goods sold
on its premises are equipped with RFID tags, and that tracking is performed.
13A much quoted figure is that 87% of all Americans are uniquely identifiable from ZIP
code, birth date, and sex, so aggregation needs to obfuscate this information [24].
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5 EPC Traces vs. Web Traces
We will now take a closer look at an already existing information market that
might prove insightful to EPC traces markets, although it seems to have been
exposed to only sparse economic research: The market of Web Analytics.14
Visitors of the World Wide Web produce traces in server logs that are often
subject to complex business models. One special tracing method is the so called
Web Bugs15, nearly invisible linked images that allow tracking of users across
different Web sites or via electronic mail. Among other things, they are used to
verify how many users viewed an ad or read an e-mail. Consequently, despite
privacy concerns, they constitute a popular basis for advertisement pricing and
market research.
Web traces are similar to EPC traces, the EPC corresponds to a client IP (and
often an additional session ID), the location information obtaining the form of
a URL being accessed. We argue that EPC trace databases will be similarly
successful, if not more so, as they mirror movements in the physical world.
However, they differ in important details.
Data. EPC traces per se do not show a sequence of volitional events (such that,
e.g., a preference for two products must be identified from their relative sequen-
tial positions) but a simultaneity of relations to things (e.g., carrying around
two products together on mornings, but never together in the afternoons).
Aggregation Technology. EPC traces bring about new algorithmic chal-
lenges: Needed are algorithms on spatio-temporal data of high resolution; data
integration to obtain a semantic and thus actionable results; and algorithms
that work on data with a rich relational structure.
Such algorithms have been developed over the past decades. They align dif-
ferent granularities of spatial data (e.g., geographical coordinates and street
networks), they can integrate the semantics of space and also of action models
(e.g., a person’s home and work location, different kinds of trips), for a current
example see [17]. Advances in (multi-)relational data mining [6] are also sub-
stantial. Thus, if the supplier of EPC traces offers analysis options, the costs
for additional intelligence are low.
The Passive Role of the User. EPC traces arise from ubiquitous contexts
and not from limited interaction with software via an interface that can be
configured by the user. The consequences are the occurrence of more traces,
and in principle traces that have higher density than the corresponding traces
collected on the Web. On the other hand, the interpretation of what an ID-time-
location triple means may become even harder than with click traces. In the
14This market is changing at the moment, because a big player has entered
the stage: Google now provides analysis of click traces for free (Google Analytics
http://www.google.com/analytics). Such services are possible for EPC traces as well.
15EFF Definition: http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Marketing/web_bug.html
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Web trace business, errors are sometimes intentionally fed into the databases
by privacy-aware users. Another aspect of the passive role of the user in the
collection of EPC traces is that she cannot effectively lie about the data that is
generated.
The Problem of Coverage. The spatial entities that are being tracked are
different, and so is the locus of control. EPC tracing also starts from locations,
but these are usually public and exist independently of the objects that are
being tracked. In the absence of universal tracking coverage, the collectors of
traces cannot guarantee the collection of data that might be of interest to a
given customer.
This will be mitigated by the following circumstances: First, the trace collector
may be the owner of the space under surveillance. In this case, the situation is
very similar to the Web, the market risk is low, and good coverage is affordable.
Second, the trace collector may have entered into a contract to collect traces at
specific locations. The risk that no interesting data are collected must be borne
by either or both of the contract partners, and appropriate pricing models will
need to be developed. Third, these bootstrapping problems do not exist if com-
panies already gather data for purposes other than trading, yielding tradeable
traces as a positive externality.
Summing up, the collection and analysis of EPC traces seem to imply only man-
ageable additional business risks compared to Web tracing, but will encounter
much higher demand, as there are more customers interested in tracing the
physical than the virtual world.
6 Economic Research Problems
In the following we discuss some issues that may arise in the EPC markets
between the data consumers and the data suppliers, and identify future research
questions in modelling this relationship.
Web Trace Markets. What is the state of Web trace markets today, how
much money is made? Similarities and differences to EPC trace markets need
to be studied further.
Initialization of EPC Trace Markets. We introduced some initialization
scenarios in Section 5. During the initial phases of the market it may not be
clear how suppliers of EPC traces can best select the locations of their readers
and find the appropriate customers for their trace collections or aggregated data.
Information Asymmetry. Contracts between trace collectors and trace con-
sumers will include information on target EPCs and locations. Customers of
data will reveal their specific interest in the process, while the supplier won’t
give data away indiscriminately. This could cause contracting problems and
14
may result in information asymmetries that may lead to market failures. The
implementation of design mechanisms to avoid such a market failure is a topic
of future research.
Quality Assurance. The market of EPC traces will be vulnerable to malicious
actors who sell fake traces. Competitive partners may be interested in injecting
false data in order to effect the analyses of their competitors. This may lead
actors utilizing the traces to false analyses and decisions, and may have economic
repercussions.
7 Conclusions
Under the assumptions that networked RFID technology and usage of the Elec-
tronic Product Code in general become ubiquitous, we have argued that there
is a strong incentive to aggregate and subsequently trade traces of EPCs.
We have assessed the nature of the business models involved and investigated po-
tential buyers of trace-based products. A closer look at the supply side brought
us to the preliminary conclusion that despite potential technical and legal bar-
riers trace markets will emerge.
Comparing the trace market to Web Bugs has given indicators that business risk
for data providers and market initialization will be manageable. Further, we
have sketched some topics for further economic research concerning the relation
of data consumers and providers.
Evaluating our results in the broader context of society, we come to the conclu-
sion that ultimately a balance between two extreme states needs to be found:
One extreme would be a state in which only secure RFID technology is intro-
duced that doesn’t produce much information on individuals or goods. Given
the current technological developments this state is impractical and economi-
cally ineffectual. In the other extreme state security is not an issue, information
flows perfectly free (and hopefully for the benefit of both individuals and the
corporate world), but privacy is drastically eroded by the emerging information
markets.
Crucial questions are: Where do we, as individuals, want to be between these
two possible states in our daily lives, potentially despite the market forces? And
will scalable and usable security and privacy enhancements to RFID and EPC
systems be implemented to get us there?
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A Appendix: Profiles as Products, Today
RFID and EPC traces will increase the granularity of profiling individuals, cre-
ating new paths for data mining to extract high level information. For some
data there already exists a market today.
The following is a partial price list (May, 2006) cited from the SWIPE project
(http://www.turbulence.org/Works/swipe/). The prices are collected from
commercial warehouses and profile brokers (Accurint, Aristotle, ChoicePoint,
ChoiceTrust, DocuSearch, Experian, KnowX, Merlin Data, and Pallorium). All
prices in $.
General
Address 0.50
Zip Code 0.50
Past Addresses 9.95
Date of Birth 2.00
Marriage 7.95
Divorce 7.95
Education 12.00
Employment 13.00
Published Phone # 0.25
Unpub. Phone # 17.50
Cellular Phone # 10.00
Past Phone #s 0.50
Relatives 3.00
Neighbors 0.25
Registered URL/Domain Name 0.25
Soc. Security # 8.00
Financial
Credit 9.00
Real Estate 1.50
Bankruptcy 26.50
Worker’s Compensation 18.00
Assets 6.95
Assets Seized 2.95
Shareholder 1.50
Executive Affiliation 0.50
Own Aircraft 1.50
Own Boat 1.50
Own Vehicle 0.75
Own Business 9.95
License Info
Driver Lic. Info 3.00
Motor Veh. Reg. 3.00
List of Vehicles 0.70
Accident Reg. 1.00
Aircraft Lic. 1.50
Drug Enforcement Admin. (DEA) Lic. 0.25
Hunt & Fish Lic. 0.25
Professional Lic. 0.75
Industry Accreditation 16.00
Merchant Vessel 0.25
Concealed Weapon 0.25
Firearms Lic. 0.25
Legal
Lawsuits 2.95
Felony 16.00
Misdemeanor 9.00
Sex Offender 13.00
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B Appendix: Electronic Product Code (EPC)
The most prevalent kind of EPC (SGTIN-96) has a length of 96 bit and corre-
sponds to a SGTIN (Serialized Global Trade Identification Number). The main
structure of this EPC is as follows [7] (see Figure 2):
Figure 2: Electronic Product Code (SGTIN-96 EPC)
The Header defines the kind of number that is encoded (here SGTIN-96). Filter
Value is a rough object classification (e.g., retail item). Partition determines the
exact boundary between the two following values. Company Prefix (former EPC
Manager) determines which company issued this EPC (usually the manufacturer
of the corresponding item). The Item Reference (Object Class) determines
the exact category that the tagged object belongs to, and the Serial Number
identifies a particular item within the same object class.
Note that this serial number enriches the information carried by an EPC tag
significantly compared to a bar code, making distinction between individual
items of the same kind possible.
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